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I. Introduction
In 1996, the Clinton administration continued to pursue major international trade initiatives
as part of an ongoing effort to increase the competitiveness of U.S. businesses abroad, maximize
job creation within the United States, and enhance the standard of living throughout the world.
The momentum developed by the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the Uruguay
Round agreements, and various regional trade arrangements resulted in several significant devel-
opments this past year.
In 1996, the linkages between unilateral, regional, and global trade initiatives became increas-
ingly apparent. The availability and activities of different institutions within the global trading
system provided the United States and other countries the opportunity to pursue trade initiatives
at several levels in a mutually reinforcing manner. For example, U.S. initiatives in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum (a regional trade arrangement) were directly supportive of U.S.
objectives in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (a global trade organization). Key structural
or institutional developments in the international trade arena are addressed below.
The year of 1996 also saw major developments in the negotiation of trade agreements. The
WTO and APEC forums provided a framework to achieve multilateral trade commitments and
also reinforced key bilateral negotiations. At the same time, the U.S. Government independently
pursued trade commitments, either as part of its ongoing trade agenda or in response to trade
relief complaints. While only a few such agreements can be highlighted, this past year's develop-
ments suggest an acceleration in the use of negotiated agreements to address bilateral and
multilateral trade disputes.
At the same time, the negotiation of regional and multilateral trade agreements that contain
dispute resolution procedures and/or rules pertaining to national trade remedy procedures has
enhanced the acceptance of dispute resolution procedures to address perceived trade imbalances
and unfair trade practices. Indeed, as tariffs continue to fall in the face of trade liberalization
agreements, and disciplines are imposed on nontariff barriers, one might expect increasing
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utilization of trade relief procedures based on widely accepted principles. This year was high-
lighted by several interesting dispute resolution decisions at the multilateral level (e.g., before
the WTO), regional level (e.g., under the NAFFA), and the national level (e.g., U.S. import
relief proceedings). Only a few cases can be highlighted to illustrate some novel issues within
the international trade arena in 1996.
II. Institutional Developments
The year 1996 saw major developments at the regional, global, and bilateral levels. At the
regional level, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) continued to play a major
role in the liberalization of trade flows among its member countries and more broadly. On
November 22-23, 1996, the trade ministers of APEC's eighteen members' met in Manila,
Philippines and issued the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), outlining broad objectives
and actions for the next 12 months when the ministers will meet in Vancouver, Canada. The
MAPA described various individual and collective voluntary undertakings to achieve reduced
tariffs,2 to lower barriers to foreign investment, and to adopt government policies intended to
facilitate business activity and travel across national boundaries. While many of the specific
objectives identified in individual member "action plans" were coincident with existing trade
commitments, several fresh initiatives were unveiled.' In aid of strengthening the APEC, the
ministers decided to end a moratorium on new memberships and to develop membership criteria
for adoption at the 1997 Vancouver ministerial meeting. 4 It is anticipated that new members
will be announced during the 1998 APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur, with actual admission
occurring during the 1999 meeting in Auckland.
The APEC's significance extends beyond the objective of regional trade liberalization, as
global trade initiatives also received a boost. For example, the APEC provided a springboard
to generate support for the Information Technology Agreement announced during the December
WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore. A number of APEC members also announced measures
intended to liberalize trade in various service industries, induding transportation, telecommunica-
tions, energy, finance, and professional services. Their undertakings could provide important
momentum for further negotiations on trade in services within the framework of the WTO.
As further evidence of APEC's relevance to the global trading system, China and Taiwan
undertook in the APEC ministerial to liberalize their respective tariff regimes which, in turn,
will be relevant to each country's current efforts to join the WTO.
At the global level, the World Trade Organization wrestled with the implementation of
existingUruguay Round commitments among member countries, as well as questions concerning
the expansion of the WTO's competence into other areas critical to future trade liberalization
efforts. Throughout 1996, the WTO's attention necessarily focused on the "built-in agenda,"
I. The eighteen existing members of APEC are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
2. During the 1994 ministerial meeting in Bogar, Indonesia, the APEC members established the common
objective of achieving free trade among all developing country members by 2020, and all developed country
members by 2010.
3. Indonesia announced new tariff cuts, South Korea will seek to modify certain import laws, and the
Philippines will pursue additional privatization initiatives. APEC members also agreed to facilitate business travel
and to create an Internet-accessible customs information data base.
4. Eleven countries have applied to join the APEC: Colombia, Ecuador, India, Macao, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, The Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
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and the need to ensure that benefits under existing agreements-for example, technical barriers
to trade, rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, trade-related investment measures,
and aspects of intellectual property-were fully realized. However, the Final Singapore Declara-
tion of the WTO Ministerial Conference,5 held in Singapore between December 9 to 13,
1996, may be more significant for the window it provides on the areas where the VWTO may
venture in the future.
For the United States, the WTO's first biennial ministerial meeting presented an opportunity
to pursue a number of new initiatives critical to the global trading system. The United States
sought and obtained a broad agreement on aggressive tariff reductions in the area of information
technology, an area that the U.S. Government assigns a high priority for economic expansion
and global trade. Likewise, the difficult issue of labor standards and their relationship to fair
trade was one which the U.S. Government sought to place within the cognizance of the WTO.
The Final Declaration recognized the International Labour Organization as the competent body
to deal with core labor standards, but also noted the relationship between labor standards and
a liberalized trading system, and acknowledged continued collaboration between the WTO
and ILO on this issue. Government procurement, which historically has been resistant to the
trade policy process, received a boost with the establishment of a working group to study
transparency in government purchasing practices with a view to promoting a more open trans-
boundary procurement system.
The 1996 WTO Ministerial was significant for what it may portend in 1997 and beyond
in other substantive trade policy areas. A working group was established to study the interrela-
tionship between trade and competition policy. While the United States believes that this
working group should focus on cartel and restrictive practices of nongovernmental entities,
other countries, including Canada, may wish to see the group examine the competitive effects
of trade relief statutes (such as existing antidumping laws and practices). Given the sensitivity
of this issue within the United States, this working group's activities will be of considerable
interest in 1997. Progress in trade in services-including professional, financial, telecommunica-
tions, and maritime transport-was specifically identified as a priority for the WTO. Environ-
mental aspects of trade will also be an area to watch in 1997, as the Committee on Trade
and Environment was encouraged to continue pursuit of its study of trade liberalization, environ-
mental protection, and economic development.
In addition, the WTO Ministerial recognized the need to reinforce and expand upon the
existing institutional framework of the global trading system. In this regard, particular attention
was given to (i) the role of regional trade agreements as reinforcing global trade liberalization
efforts, (2) the need to address the special circumstances facing least-developed countries and to
work with other institutions (such as UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre, and multilateral
lending organizations) to enhance trade opportunities, and (3) strengthening the WTO by
working with applicant countries (with China being among the top priorities) to obtain member-
ship.
The likely expansion of WTO membership in 1997, as well as the possible extension of
WTO disciplines into other areas of international trade, will place increasing emphasis on the
WTO's own institutional mechanisms for developing and deciding upon substantive trade rules.
At the close of the first biennial ministerial meeting, Director General Renato Ruggiero noted
the need for improvements to the WTO decision-making process, and developing countries
5. Reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 16, 1996, at S-I to S-6.
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voiced concerns that the trade agenda had been dominated by the interests of the more powerful
trading member states. The following year will no doubt indude discussion of whether a
centralized decision-making mechanism will be needed to ensure effective administration of
the WTO agenda. When the next biennial ministerial is convened in 1998, marking the fiftieth
anniversary of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, WTO institutional infrastructure
may be one of the key issues for discussion.
At the bilateral level, the United States and European Union continued to discuss key trade
issues within the structure of their semiannual summit meetings. In both June and December
1996, the United States and the European Union took up key international economic issues,
induding the use of extraterritorial trade restrictions to achieve national foreign policy objectives
(the so-called Helms-Burton Act intended to strengthen the U.S. embargo of Cuba, and the
Iran Libya Sanctions Act, which has been characterized as imposing a secondary boycott on
non-U.S. companies investing in those countries). European officials indicated strong interest
in a repeal of these controversial statutes, and also sought an indication of whether the president
would continue to suspend operation of the litigation provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.
This issue underscored the interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral trade institutions.
For example, the U.S. extraterritorial trade measures contained in the Helms-Burton Act have
been challenged by U.S. trading partners within the framework of both the WTO and North
American Free Trade Agreement. Important bilateral trade issues were discussed within this
institutional framework, such as agricultural trade, mutual recognition of national standards
in the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries. However, the summit provided an opportu-
nity for U.S. and European officials to discuss matters of importance beyond the bilateral trade
relationship, such as the conditions for China's accession to the WTO and achieving a broad
agreement within the WTO on telecommunications trade.
III. International Agreements and Developments
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
At the close of 1996, the United States and over two dozen other countries' announced
their commitment to an Information Technology Agreement (ITA) intended to liberalize trade
in a range of high-technology products. In conjunction with the WTO ministerial meeting in
Singapore, twenty-eight countries signed the "Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information
Technology Products," 7 agreeing to the implementation of an ITA by April 1, 1997, that
will eliminate tariffs on covered products by the year 2000. The Declaration conditions ITA
implementation on receiving commitments from countries representing ninety percent of world
trade in information technology products, and achieving an agreement on the staging of tariff
cuts beginning in July 1997. Product coverage is reflected in a list of nearly two hundred
products, induding such items as capacitors, digital photocopiers, fiber optic cables, computer
monitors, computer software, and telecommunications equipment. Work on the details of the
timing of specific tariff cuts is to be concluded early in 1997, and each signatory is to provide
a list of the Harmonized System product headings to be covered by March 1, 1997. Notably,
the ITA will embrace dispute resolution and consultative procedures under the GATT 1994.
6. The countries agreeing to the ITA are the United States, the fifteen member countries of the European
Union, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South
Korea, and Singapore.
7. Reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 16, 1996, at S-8 to S-10.
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Given the importance of information technology products to the United States economy,
as well as the economies of developed and developing countries alike, the ITA is expected to
increase international trade in the covered products by reducing the cost of these products to
consumers. Industries and businesses that depend heavily on information technology products
will have greater access to a broader spectrum of hardware and software. Condusion of an
ITA will no doubt influence the discussions on new member accession to the WTO, particularly
China, which has to date avoided any specific commitment to the tariff reductions contemplated
in the ITA. Furthermore, the ITA will provide a backdrop for ongoing negotiations for a
telecommunications agreement within the framework of the WTO (see discussion below).
B. INSURANCE
The United States and Japan reached an agreement settling an ongoing dispute regarding
access to the Japanese domestic insurance market, and thereby avoiding retaliatory measures
previously threatened by the Clinton administration. The agreement, achieved on the eve of
a December 15 deadline, commits Japan to four major undertakings in the primary insurance
market. Auto insurance companies will be allowed to write policies with variable premiums
based on factors that have traditionally been used in the U.S. market.' In the area of commercial
fire insurance, Japan agreed to reduce the policy value threshold for which competition on
price can occur. Beginning in January 1997, the threshold for competition will be lowered
from ¥30 billion to ¥20 billion, and in April 1998, it will be lowered again to W7 billion.
Japan also agreed to reform its system of insurance rating bureaus and to streamline the process
for allowing new insurance products into the market.
The U.S.-Japan insurance agreement reinforces an earlier arrangement reached in October
1994, whereby Japan had agreed not to make radical changes in Japanese insurance company
access to the so-called third sector of the insurance market (e.g., travel, nursing home, personal
accident) until reforms had been achieved in the primary sector. Foreign-based insurance compa-
nies have had success in the third-sector market, and Japan's Ministry of Finance had intended
as early as January 1997 to permit subsidiaries of Japan's primary insurance sector companies
to enter this part of the market. Under the 1996 agreement, Japan will maintain market access
protection in the third-sector for two and one-half years after implementation of the primary
insurance market reforms.
Foreign insurers are estimated to have between three and five percent of theJapanese insurance
market, which comprises about 5 350 billion in annual premiums. Apart from the potential
for greater U.S. participation in the Japanese domestic insurance market, and the possible
cost-savings to Japanese insureds from increased competition, the U.S.-Japan insurance
agreement was viewed as a test of U.S. resolve to ensure implementation of numerous bilateral
trade arrangements withJapan. Furthermore, the agreement averts possible unilateral retaliatory
measures that Japan could have been questioned before the WTO (although insurance services
are not covered under the GATT 1994).
C. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Members of the WTO are pursuing a broad-based agreement on basic telecommunications
services including voice telephone, facsimile, data by wireline, wireless, and satellite transmission
8. These factors include age and sex of the driver, geographical location of the insured, vehicle condition,
the insured's driving record, and the use of the vehicle.
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under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. A WTO Group on Basic Telecommunica-
tions was established by the WNTO after negotiations failed to reach an agreement by a previous
April 30, 1996, deadline. Member countries are seeking to obtain commitments for greater
trade access to national telecommunications markets, agreement on a common set of regulatory
principles governing national telecommunications markets, and limitations on the ability of
national governments to restrict foreign investment in national telecommunications industries.
The deadline for reaching an agreement is February 15, 1997.
The outcome of the WVTO telecommunications negotiation will be driven, in large part, by
the ability of member countries to resolve or otherwise avoid a number of contentious issues.
For example, the United States, which has over the years encouraged significant competition
in its domestic telecommunications market, is concerned with the ability of foreign telecommuni-
cations monopolies to use their national monopoly position to compete unfairly in the interna-
tional marketplace. Canada and European country members are concerned with the implications
of any agreement on broadcast content, to the extent any such agreement may cover the scope
of services provided as well as the means of providing such services. Developing countries will be
sensitive to foreign investment and the development of indigenously owned telecommunications
companies, as well as the timing of commitments under the agreement. Needless to say, the
complexity and scope of the trade, investment, regulatory, and collateral industry issues presented
in the telecommunications negotiations suggest that any agreement reached in February 1997
will necessarily not conclude WTO activity in this area, but rather provide a foundation for
future discussions and progress.
D. NAFTA EXPANSION AND FTAA
Little progress was made in 1996 on achieving an expansion of NAFTA to include Chile,
while some efforts were made toward the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
These initiatives are largely captive to renewal of the president's fast-track authority, a priority
for early resolution in the second Clinton administration. Fast-track authority is viewed as
essential to induce substantive negotiations with Chile on NAFTA accession. However, environ-
mental and labor issues have complicated the renewal of the president's fast-track authority
given congressional concerns over open trade with countries lacking significant environmental
protection or acceptable labor standards.
In a development related to NAFTA expansion, Chile and Canada signed a bilateral trade
agreement on November 15, 1996, which will eliminate customs duties on nearly eighty percent
of Canadian-Chilean bilateral trade. This agreement could serve as a vehide to expedite Chile's
accession to the NAFTA, if negotiations are started in 1997. However, one aspect of the
agreement that could prove troubling is the context of future NAFTA accession negotiations-
namely, Chile and Canada agreed to forgo use of national antidumping duties against each
country's exports. Canada has been urging the United States, with little success, to consider
a similar undertaking within the NAFTA framework, and the Canada-Chile agreement is likely
to rekindle this effort.
As for the FTAA, the December 1994 Summit of the Americas called for the completion
of negotiations by the year 2005. In support of the FTAA initiative, eleven FTAA working
groups have been established with a view to laying a foundation for the next trade ministers
meeting, scheduled for May 1997 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. A key objective of the Brazil
meeting will be to establish a timetable and structure for formal negotiations. For example,
one issue that will receive early attention is the role regional trading arrangements (notably,
NAFTA and MERCOSUR) should play in future FTAA negotiations.
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E. Tx-riLES
The United States and China continued to pursue trade negotiations in the hope of
reviewing the existing U.S.-China bilateral textile agreement scheduled to expire on Decem-
ber 31, 1996. In connection with renegotiation of the agreement, the United States sought
improved market access for U.S. exporters of textile and apparel products, a clearer under-
standing on the transshipment restrictions already in existence, improved monitoring of
Chinese textile facilities to ensure compliance with the agreement, and elimination of certain
nontariff barriers to U.S. exports. Related to the effort to renew the bilateral textile agreement
were U.S. allegations that China had violated the quota restrictions contained in the
agreement. In September 1996, the United States announced a $19 million reduction in
quota for Chinese origin textiles, based on evidence of transshipments through Hong Kong,
Mongolia, Fiji, and Turkey, in violation of the bilateral agreement. China threatened retalia-
tory measures, denying its involvement in the transshipment transgressions. A showdown
was avoided when the U.S. Government agreed to reexamine the transshipment charges,
allowing negotiations to continue into early 1997.
Renewing the U.S.-China textile agreement is a priority for the U.S. Government, given
the increasing importance of the U.S. trade relationship with China and growing sensitivity
over the U.S. trade deficit with China. In addition, Chinese concessions in the area of textile
market access could be a bellweather for broader Chinese acceptance of market access and
other trade commitments as part of its accession to the WTO. Furthermore, Chinese compliance
with its bilateral textile commitments with the United States will undoubtedly be considered
in the decision to renew MFN treatment for China.
IV. International Trade Litigation
A. WTO
If 1995 was the World Trade Organization's "debut," then 1996 was truly the debut
for the WTO's much-heralded Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).9 Two cases concerning U.S.
environmental rules for reformulated gasoline'0 and Japan's taxes on alcoholic beverages" pro-
ceeded through the complete panel and appellate stages, resulting in findings that the U.S. and
Japanese measures violated national treatment requirements. Two other panels found U.S.
9. As of December 31, 1996, WTO Members requested 64 consultations on 44 distinct matters. All of
the WTO dispute panel reports cited herein are available on WTO's Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes
< http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/buletin.htm > [hereinafter WTO Disputes Bulletin]. This number is signifi-
cant, considering that GATT 1947 had only about 200 disputes during its entire forty-seven-year existence. See
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYrICAL INDEX-GUIDE To GATT LAW AND PRAcTcrE, 771-78 (6th ed., 1995)
[hereinafter GATT ANALYrICAL INDEX]. The fact that GATT 1994 is a more comprehensive multilateral trade
agreement than its predecessor no doubt partly accounts for the large number of disputes to date. Several disputes,
for example, involve intellectual property issues brought under the TRIPs Agreement, for which GATE 1947
had no counterpart. Nevertheless, the number of requests for consultation made thus far is still quite extraordinary.
10. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (January 29, 1996), WT/
DS2/AB (April 29, 1996) (both adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter United States Gasoline]. See WATO Disputes
Bulletine, supra note 9.
11. Japan-Taxes on Alrobolic Beverages, WT/DS8, WT/DS10, WT/DS1 I (July 1I, 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSI 1/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (both adopted Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcohol
Taxes].
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restrictions on imports of underwear from Costa Rica 2 and wool shirts from India" to be
inconsistent with the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The final panel held that GATT
1994 was not applicable to a Brazilian countervailing duty imposed on desiccated coconut
from the Philippines, but noted that Brazil's actions merited serious concern. 4 Given that
GATT 1994 constitutes a more comprehensive rules-based approach to governing international
trade than did GATT 1947, the reports issued in 1996 provide the first indications of the
development and direction of WTO jurisprudence.
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the United States
was not justified in applying an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation known
as the "Gasoline Rule" to gasoline imported from Venezuela and Brazil. The rule applied
different standards-called baselines-to imported gasoline than were applied to domestic gaso-
line to determine whether the Clean Air Act's requirements were met.' The Panel found that
the use of different baselines for imported and domestic gasoline violated the national treatment
provisions of Article 111:4 of GATT 1994. The Panel also found that the Gasoline Rule was
not justified under, inter alia, Article XX(g), which allows Members to adopt conservation
measures that affect imports if they are applied together with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption. The Panel saw no direct connection between the U.S. decision to treat imported
gasoline less favorably than domestic gasoline, and the U.S. objective of improving air quality
in the United States.
The Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XX(g) by
focusing only on that portion of the EPA regulation that dealt with baseline establishment
methods, rather than on the regulation in its entirety. The Appellate Body reasoned that
eliminating the use of baselines would frustrate the Gasoline Rule's primary objective of pre-
venting further air pollution. " Article XX(g) required only "even-handedness" in the imposition
of restrictions on imported and domestic products, not identical treatment.
The Panel also had erred by not applying the chapeau of Article XX-which provides that
measures may be justified under an exception only if they "do not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination . .. or a disguised restriction on international trade"
to the Gasoline Rule. The Appellate Body, applying the chapeau de novo, found that the Gasoline
Rule did not satisfy the requirements. No doubt cognizant of the tremendous scrutiny which
the first DSB Appellate Body report would receive, the Appellate Body stressed that this decision
did not impair the ability of WTO Members to adopt their own environmental regulations.
WTO Members retain "a large measure of autonomy" in their environmental policies, but
must respect the requirements of GATT 1994 in exercising that autonomy.
7
12. United States-Restriction; on Imports of Cotton andManmade Fibre Underwear, 1996 WI 738823 (G. A.T.T.),
(Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter United States-Underwear]. On November 11, 1996, Costa Rica announced that
it would appeal certain panel legal interpretations. See WTO Disputes Bulletin, supra note 9.
13. United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33 (Jan.
6, 1997) [hereinafter United States-Wool Shirts]. The Panel completed its work on the report in December
1996, but the report was not released to the WTO Members until January 6, 1997. See WTO Panel Rules for
India in Dispute witb US. over Wool Shin Quotas, INSIDE U.S. TtADE, Dec. 20, 1996, at 8.
14. Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22 (Oct. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Brazil-Coconut].
On December 16, 1996, the Philippines announced its intention to appeal the decision. See WTO Disputes
Bulletin, supra note 2.
15. United States-Gasoline, supra note 10, Panel Report, 2.1-2.13.
16. Id., Appellate Body Report at 19.
17. Id. at 30.
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In Taxes on Alcobolic Beverages, a case brought against Japan by the United States, Canada,
and the European Union, the Appellate Body and the Panel both found that Japan's Liquor
Tax Law, which imposed different tax rates on sbocbu, a Japanese spirit, than on other alcoholic
beverages, such as whiskey and vodka (much of which was imported), was inconsistent with
Article III's prohibition against dissimilar taxation between imported and domestic products.
Specifically, the Panel found the Liquor Tax Law violated Artide 111:2, which prohibits
(1) applying internal taxes in imports that are in excess of those applied to domestic "like
products," and (2) applying different taxes on directly competitive or substitutable imported
and domestic products in a manner that protects domestic production.' 8
The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel Report's result, but modified the Panel's legal interpre-
tation of Artide III. The Panel had reasoned that because Article III: 1 states "general principles"
concerning the imposition of internal taxes, and Article 111:2 contains specific obligations, the
starting point for interpreting Artide 111:2 was Article 111:2 itself, and not Article III: 19 The
Appellate Body found that the Panel had erred by not taking into account Artide III: 1 in
interpreting Article 111:2.
The Appellate Body also found that the Panel had blurred the distinction between the issue
of whether directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products are not similarly
taxed, and the separate issue of whether the tax is applied to protect domestic production. The
latter issue required an objective analysis of the tax measure's structure and application to
determine whether it is protective. Here, the difference between the tax rates for sbocbu and
other alcoholic beverages was sufficient to indicate the tax protected Japanese sbocbu production.
In other cases, however, factors other than the difference in tax rates may be more relevant
to demonstrate protective taxation. The Appellate Body stressed that panels should give full
consideration to all relevant facts and circumstances in their analysis.2" WTO rules are not "so
rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments" in addressing the "ever-
changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases.... They will serve the multilateral trading
system best if they are interpreted with that in mind."'"
These first two reports issued by the Appellate Body shared several characteristics. Neither
showed much deference to the panels' legal interpretations, even though the results in both
cases were affirmed. Further, although the Appellate Body's jurisdiction is limited to legal issues
raised in appeals from panel reports, as a practical matter, the Appellate Body conducted a de
novo review of some issues in both cases. Finally, both of these reports reflect pragmatism in
the application of the GATT 1994 rules to disputes.
Two panel reports applied the new Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) to U.S.
quotas on imports of underwear from Costa Rica and wool shirts and blouses from India. In
each case, the quotas were found to be inconsistent with the ATC's requirements. The quotas
had been imposed by the U.S. Committee for Implementation of Textiles Agreements (CITA)
18. Japan-Alcohol Taxes, supra note 11, Panel Report, 7.1.
19. Id. 6.11, 6.12.
20. Id., Appellate Body Report at 30-31. This case also presented the question of the legal status of adopted
GATT panel reports. In 1987, the GATT had adopted a panel report on a similar Japanese Liquor Tax Law
that was found to be inconsistent with GATT Article III: 2. The Panel found that adopted panel reports are an
integral part of GATT 1994 and constitute subsequent practice in a specific case, but that subsequent panels
were not obligated to follow adopted reports. Panel Report, 6.10. The Appellate Body disagreed, noting that
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council had the "exclusive authority" to adopt interpretations of
the Agreement. The Appellate Body also observed that the decision by the Contracting Parties to adopt a panel
report did not necessarily mean they agreed with the report's legal reasoning. Appellate Body Report at 13-15.
21. Id. at 32.
SUMMER 1997
442 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
after finding that imports of underwear from Costa Rica 2  and wool shirts and blouses from
India21 were causing serious damage to U.S. producers of these respective products. Neither
the ATC nor the DSB's rules provide a specific standard of review for panels to apply in these
cases.24 Drawing on Article I I of the Understanding on Dispute Settlement,2 both Panels
adopted a standard of review that is analogous to that applied by U.S. courts reviewing U.S.
administrative agency determinations. Specifically, the Panels did not substitute their judgments
for that of CITA by conducting a de novo review of the facts, but instead stated they would
assess objectively CITA's review and the evidence relied upon by CITA.26 In each case, the
Panels found that CITA had not satisfied the ATC's prerequisites for implementingnew restraints
on textile imports. In the Underwear case, for example, the Panel found inconsistencies and
gaps in CITA's analysis that raised questions about the reliability of CITA's findings.2 In Wool
Sbirts, among other shortcomings, CITA had used industry data that was not specific to the
wool shirt and blouse industry.2"
In a transitional case, a Panel examined Brazil's administration of its countervailing duty
statute. Brazil had instituted a countervailing duty investigation of imports of Philippine desic-
cated coconut in June 1994, six months before GATT 1994 came into effect, and imposed
a final countervailing duty in August 1995. The Philippines contended that Brazil's actions
were inconsistent with, inter alia, Article VI of GATT 1994. The Philippines did not invoke
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, since that Agreement specifically
applied only to investigations initiated after the GATT 1994's entry into force. 9 The Panel
never reached the merits, however, because it found that Article VI of GATT 1994 was
inapplicable since Brazil's investigation predated GAT 1994's entry into force. The Panel
rejected the Philippines' contention that provisions of GATT 1994 could be invoked separately
from the SCM Agreement.'0 The Panel noted, however, that parties in transitional cases such
as this were not necessarily without a remedy. The Philippines could have pursued dispute
settlement before the Tokyo Round SCM Committee, which remained in operation for two
years after GATT 1994 came into effect, although the Panel acknowledged that this remedy
was not a complete substitute for WTO dispute settlement.3"
22. United States-Underwear, supra note 12, Panel Report, I 2.8-2.14.
23. United States-Wool Shirts, supra note 13, Panel Report, 2.1-2.7.
24. United States-Underwear, supra note 12, Panel Report, 1 7.8; United States-Wool Shirts, supra note
13, Panel Report, 7.16.
25. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). Article II
reads in pertinent part: "[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements ... "
26. See United States-Underwear, supra note 12, Panel Report, 1 7.12 ("We do not ... see our review
as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities.... Rather ... , the Panel's
function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case
the CITA"); United States-Wool Shirts, supra note 13, Panel Report, 1 7.16. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (195 1) (reviewing court may not displace the agency's choice
"between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had
the matter been before it de novo.").
27. United States-Underwear, supra note 12, Panel Report, 11 7.31, 7.37, 7.38.
28. United States-Wool Shirts, supra note 13, Panel Report, 11 7.39, 7.42.
29. Brazl-Coconut, supra note 14, Panel Report, 43-44.
30. Id. at 11 232-257.
31. Id. at 271-273, 277.
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In conclusion, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body had a very active docket in 1996. The
first group of decisions covered such traditional GATT issues as national treatment, as well
as new issues arising under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and a transitional case.
It should be noted that in both Reformulated Gasoline and Taxes on Akobol, the losing parties-
the United States and Japan-have indicated they will change their respective measures in
accordance with the results in those cases." The fact that two of the world's largest trading
countries and most important WTO Members have indicated their intentions to comply with
these decisions is a positive omen for the future of the new DSB as a credible and effective
mechanism for resolving trade disputes.
B. NAFTA
Two panel decisions under NAFTA Chapter 19 involving Canadian exports to the United
States were issued in 1996. In Color Picture Tubes from Canada," a panel rejected a challenge
to the U.S. Commerce Department's failure to revoke an antidumping duty order. In the
underlying administrative proceedings, the Commerce Department had failed to comply with
its regulations requiring revocation if, by the last day of the fifth anniversary month after
publication of the order, no party had requested an administrative review. The Commerce
Department had also failed to comply with its regulation requiring it to publish timely notice
of its intent to revoke the order and serve such notice on interested parties. When the Commerce
Department subsequently published a notice of intent to revoke two years late, several unions
objected causing the department to maintain the existing antidumping order. Mitsubishi Elec-
tronics Industries, Inc., challenged the Commerce Department's decision, arguing that the order
had expired pursuant to law and the department's failure to follow its own procedures (i.e.,
providing timely notice to interested parties of its intent to revoke the order) could not be a
basis to resuscitate the order. .
The Panel affirmed the Commerce Department, relying heavily on U.S. law as applied in
a similar situation in Kemira Fibres Qy v. United States.34 The Panel found that the regulations
at issue presented two conflicting imperatives: (1) that an antidumping order expires if five
years pass without a request for administrative review, and (2) that the Commerce Department
publish a timely notice of intent to revoke an order to allow interested parties to object. In
Kemira Fibres, the department had been tardy in publishing its notice by ninety days, while
in the case at hand the Department had delayed almost two years. Despite its concern with
the much longer delay, the Panel still found that the failure to publish a timely notice of
revocation was not prejudicial since an earlier, timely publication, according to the Panel, would
have led to an objection to revocation by domestic interested parties. The Panel did, however,
express concern that the Commerce Department's failure to meet the publication deadline could
have implications for its commitment to meeting its obligation under the 1994 Uruguay Round
agreements to "sunset" antidumping orders after five years."
32. See U.S. Will Comply witb WTO Gas Panel, But Does Not Say How, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 21, 1996,
at 3; Japan Set to Comply witb WTO Ruling, Will Revise Domestic Liquor Taxes, J. OF COM., Dec. 18, 1996, at
4A.
3 3. Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Panel No. USA-95-1904-03, 1996 FTAPD LEXIS I (May 6, 1996).
34. 61 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
35. Id. at 12 and n.26, citing Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 11, § 11.3.
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The second NAFTA panel decision involved a challenge to an antidumping determination
by Revenue Canada involving refined sugar exports from the United States. 6 The challenge
posed three issues. First, Revenue Canada had decided that in calculating the normal value of
the refined sugar, the U.S. operating company and its wholly owned production subsidiary
should be analyzed as a single entity. Second, Revenue Canada had rejected the U.S. exporter's
accounting methodology for calculating its cost of production, and required that the "actual
costs" associated with production be calculated. Third, Revenue Canada found that a particular
contract did not establish the date of sale for later transactions under the contract, because the
contact did not fix the price, quantity, or quality of the goods. The Panel affirmed each of
Revenue Canada's rulings as reasonable, except that it remanded for additional analysis of
several technical issues related to the "actual costs" associated with the exporter's production.
A critical issue for the Panel in reaching its decision was which standard of review to apply
to Revenue Canada's determinations, the more rigorous "correctness" standard or the more
tolerant "reasonableness" standards. Noting that Revenue Canada is the agency responsible
for administering the antidumping law, the Panel concluded that the latter standard was applica-
ble, Given that the Canadian antidumping law did not define key terms such as "exception,"
"cost of production," and "date of sale," the Panel also found that Revenue Canada's interpreta-
tion and application of those key terms were reasonable.
In two 1996 decisions under NAFTA Chapter 20, a binational dispute resolution panel
upheld Canada's right to protect domestic dairy, poultry, egg, margarine, and barley products
with tariffs." After the WTO banned quotas last year, Canada replaced its import quotas
with equivalent tariffs. The United States challenged Canada's action as violating a NAFTA
requirement to eliminate all tariffs on U.S. products by 1998. Canada claimed that its actions
were consistent with a grandfather clause in NAFTA. The binational panel issued an interim
decision in July that Canada had acted consistent with its WTO and NAFTA obligations, and
reaffirmed this decision in November.
V. U.S. Trade Litigation
In March 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a significant decision
on the issue of whether the privatization of a state-owned company affects the countervailability
of past subsidies received by the company.8 The Commerce Department had determined that
Saarstahl Vollingen GmbH (Saarstahl SVK) received a subsidy from government debt forgiveness
in connection with the 1989 sale of most of its stock, and that the benefit of this subsidy
passed through to the new owner of Saarstahl SVK's assets, Dillinger Hutte Saarstahl AG
(DHS). The department found, however, that a portion of the subsidy was repaid in the
privatization. The Court of International Trade (CIT) vacated the Department of Commerce's
decision, holding that the arm's-length sale of Saarstahl SVK extinguished any remaining "com-
petitive benefit" from the past subsidies, because the price presumably included the market
value of any continuing benefit.
36. In the matter of. Final Determination of Dumping Regarding Certain Refined Sugar, Refined from Sugar
Cane or Sugar Beets, in Granulated, Liquid and Powdered Form, Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America, Panel No. CDA-95-1904-04, 1996 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Oct. 9, 1996).
37. Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Panel No. CDA-95-2008-01
(Dec. 2, 1996).
38. See Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996), reb'g and reb'g en banc denied,
June 7, 1996.
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The Federal Circuit reversed, Judge Plager dissenting. After noting the deference owed to
Commerce Department decisions, the court rejected the CIT's premise that subsidies could
not be countervailed unless they confer a competitive advantage on the goods exported. The
court reasoned that the statute does not require any such showing, nor did the legislative
history.3" The decision applied the countervailing duty statute as in effect before the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA) of 1994. The URAA contains a specific provision on the
privatization issue.' The court viewed the CIT's decision as improperly requiring the Depart-
ment to consider the "effect" of a subsidy, a task which Congress has given to the International
Trade Commission (ITC), not the Commerce Department. The court viewed as reasonable
the Department's decision that a portion of the past subsidies could be repaid in connection
with a privatization, but rejected the CIT's holding that as a matter of law no subsidies could
pass through after an arm's-length privatization.
This decision may affect other steel cases currently pending before the Federal Circuit.
Moreover, while decided under the pre-URAA statute, the Federal Circuit's decision is also
likely to influence the Commerce Department's interpretation of the privatization provision
contained in the amended statute.
On June 1, 1995, the Commerce Department initiated antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations against imports from Italy and Turkey. On July 10, 1995, the ITC preliminarily
determined that there was a reasonable indication of material injury by reason of subject imports.
Subsequently, on June 14, 1996, the Department issued its final countervailing determination,
finding countervailing duty rates ranging from 0 percent to 11.23 percent for Italy and from
3.87 percent to 15.82 percent for the Turkish respondents. These countervailing duty investiga-
tions were significant because they were the first in which the Department examined whether
certain subsidies to disadvantaged regions were noncountervailable under the "green light"
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(Act).
On June 14, 1996, the Department also issued its final antidumping determination, finding
antidumping rates ranging from 0 percent to 46.67 percent for Italian respondents and 56.87
percent and 63.29 percent for the two Turkish respondents. The Department's pasta antidump-
ing investigations were significant because they were the first to implement many of the new
provisions of the Act, such as level of trade and targeted dumping. In addition, the ITC's
finding that the U.S. pasta industry was materially injured by reason of Italian and Turkish
dumping is of note because the ITC was confronted with determining how to weigh evidence
from consumers who purchase domestic and imported pasta on the basis of perceived quality,
authenticity, and brand attributes.
In October 1996, the Commerce Department entered into a suspension agreement with
Mexican tomato exporters to settle a pending antidumping complaint initiated by U.S. tomato
growers earlier in 1996. The Commerce Department had preliminarily found Mexican tomatoes
to be dumped in the U.S. market, and had issued tentative margins of approximately seventeen
percent. The suspension agreement, which could be executed once a preliminary determination
was issued and after public comment, commits Mexican growers not to sell at a price below
an established reference price. The reference price is based on the lowest average Mexican
import prices consistent with an absence of price suppression in the U.S. market. The agreement
39. Id. at 1542-43.
40. See 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1677(5XF).
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also contains measures to permit the Commerce Department to monitor imports and prices,
and to ensure that Mexican growers do not circumvent their commitments.
The suspension agreement eliminated the need for further trade litigation proceedings, as
it was intended to eliminate the injurious effects of Mexican imports. While U.S. antidumping
procedures provide for the termination of trade relief investigations through negotiated
agreements, the tomatoes agreement is noteworthy since such suspension agreements are infre-
quently negotiated. In part, the sensitivity of any type of price undertaking under U.S. antitrust
laws can deter U.S. and foreign competitors from considering a settlement of pending trade
litigation. Any such suspension agreement therefore requires the active involvement and endorse-
ment of Commerce Department officials from the outset. Whether the tomatoes suspension
agreement will spark renewed interest in negotiated settlements for U.S. trade litigation actions
will in part depend on the ability of litigants to navigate antitrust concerns of U.S. trade officials
to assist in this process.
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